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TAXPAYERS' REMEDIES-WASHINGTON PROPERTY
TAXES
BRECK P. McALLISTER

"

It is an idle matter to write about taxpayers' remedies in the
generalities that are required if a particular procedural device is
lifted from its setting as a part of the taxing machinery of a particular state or taxing authority. Procedural devices are, after all,
simply a way of getting a particular question before a court. In
some states the legislature has set out the remedies that must be
pursued, while in others this task has been left to the courts, and
in most there is a combination of both. The legal armory of any
court is full of a great variety of remedies that may be put to use
when tax questions are involved. There are actions at law, bills
in equity, actions to remove clouds on title and extraordinary writs,
such as certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus and
others, too. The use of any one of these methods will depend upon
a variety of considerations, not the least of which will be the
position of taxpayers in view of other available remedies. Then
there is the question as to the effect of the use of a given remedy,
such as injunction, for example, on the revenue collecting machinery of the state. Some of these devices come into court so
encrusted with common law traditions growing out of their use
in alien fields that courts must be prepared to fashion them anew
if they are to perform any useful function in the new field.
The purpose of the discussion that follows is to consider the
great variety of procedural devices that were developed largely
by the courts prior to the anti-injunction statute of 1931, and
to consider them in their setting in the tax machinery of the
state. That statute represented an important shift in policy but
until it is considered against the background of earlier available
remedies it is difficult to understand the part that it will play in
the future. Some consideration will also be given to the scope of
judicial review as developed by the courts and the relation of
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
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this to the action that must be taken by the administrative machinery engaged in the taxation of property in this state.
An Outline of the Machinery for the Assessment of Property, the
Levy of a Tax and Its Collection: Administrative Remedies
In any scheme of ad valorem property taxation, the steps that
must be taken may be classified under three headings: (1) the assessment of the property subject to the tax, (2) the levy of the
tax, and (3) the collection of the tax. It is necessary to understand, at least in outline, the machinery by which the state accomplishes these steps in order to understand the mistakes that may
be made by taxing officers and boards, the powers of different
officers and boards to correct mistakes made by others or by themselves, and the remedies available to the taxpayer in the administrative hierarchy. It will then be possible to examine and evaluate
the various procedural devices that have been developed by the
courts with or without benefit of statute to afford remedies to the
taxpayer other than those available in the administrative machinery.
(a) The Assessment of Property.
The statutes prescribe the rule by which property is to be taxed.
In order to ascertain the amount due from each taxpayer the state
must provide the machinery for applying the rule to the facts in
each taxpayer's case. The rule, for present purposes, may be
simply stated: Except as specifically exempted or otherwise taxed,'
all real property shall be listed and assessed in every even numbered year at 50 per cent of its true and fair value in money on
January 1 of that year, and all personal property shall be simassessed every year. The tax is levied on this
ilarly listed and
2
assessed value.
The machinery for the listing and assessment of property, except the "operating property" of certain public utilities,3 and
lands classified as "reforestation lands",' starts with the county
assessor in each county.' All real and personal property is sub'Lands classified by the State Forest Board as "reforestation lands"
are assessed at values fixed by statute, REM. REV. STAT. §§ 11219-1-16;
State ex rel Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P. (2d)
539 (1934).
'REM. REV. STAT. §§ 11111-11112-1, 11135.
'The assessment of what is defined by statute as "operating property"
of certain public utilities is made by the State Tax Commission, while
"non-operating property" is assessed by the county assessor, REM. REV.
STAT. §§ 11156-1-20; 11172-1-15.
4Supra
note 1.
'REM. REV. STAT. § 11140. Listing and assessment by township as-
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ject to taxation unless specifically exempted.6 Real property must
be listed and assessed in every even numbered year and personal
property every year.7 Both kinds of property are defined s and
must be valued with reference to the value on January Ist.9 Even
exempt property must be listed and assessed, and the owner claiming exemption must submit his proofs to the assessor.10 There
are special provisions relating to certain types of property such
as migratory cattle, horses, sheep and goats, to lumber and sawlogs, and to persons who move from county to county or who
come into the state for the first time." There are details as to
the place where different kinds of personal property are to be
listed and assessed.' 2 All property must be assessed at "fifty per
cent of its true and fair value in money", and the statute sets out
a general standard to be followed in reaching this value. 8 There
are details as to the books and records that must be kept by the
assessor' and various requirements imposed on owners of property to furnish correct statements of property subject to taxation. 5
The assessor is required to complete the performance of these
manifold and important duties by May 31st of each even numbered year 6 and on the first Monday of July of each year he must
file his assessment books with the County Board of Equalization.'7
Up to this point the contacts between the assessor and the taxpayer may have been many or few, or there may have been
none at all. There are no requirements as to notice to the taxpayer and the assessor proceeds to do his work in his own way
and at his own time. There may, however, be actual opportunities
for informal discussions and conferences with the assessor or his
deputies, but beyond this sort of thing the taxing machinery proceeds without any formalities as to notice or hearing to the taxpayer. As far as matters of valuation are concerned, the entire
matter is out of the hands of the assessor when he has certified
sessors which prevailed only in Spokane and Whatcom Counties was
abolished in 1937. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 11443-1.
'The exemptions are many, and will be found In REM. REV. STAT.

§§ 11111-1-9.

'REM. REEV. STAT. § 11112.
RrEM. REV. STAT. §§ 11108-11109.
OREm. REV. STAT. § 11112-1.
"REx. Ruv. STAT. § 11113.
"REm. REV. STAT. §§ 11116-11118.
"2REm. REV. STAT. §§ 11120-11125.
'REm. REV. STAT. § 11135.
"1REM. REV. STAT. §§ 11136-11137, 11127.
"15REM. REV. STAT. §§ 11119, 11126, 11128-11132, 11141.
"REm. REV. STAT. § 11140; see also § 11141 which validates listings
and assessments made after the fourth Monday of May.
17REm. REv. STAT. § 11148.
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his assessment books to the County Board of Equalization. After
that the values shown in the books are beyond his power to
change."'
The next step is the equalization of the values fixed by the
assessor. This is done by a County Board of Equalization in each
county. The County Board meets on the first Mklonday in July,
and may remain in session for two weeks only.19 Its task is to
examine the lists submitted by the assessor and "equalize" the
values "so that each tract or lot of real property and each article
or class of personal property shall be entered on the assessmentlist at its true and fair value". To accomplish this, it may raise
or lower the value of any piece of real property. It may lower a
value without notice, but no raise may be made without five days
written notice to the owner. As to personal property, the statute
permits it to raise values of classes of property without notice,
but notice must be given when it raises "the aggregate value" of
property of an individual. At this point the taxpayer has statutory notice of the meeting of the County Board and of its powers.
He knows that the Board cannot raise the value of his property
without notice, and if he is served with such notice he may, of
course, appear before the Board and be heard. 0 He may also appear before the Board on his own initiative and complain of any
value fixed by the assessor, or of any action that the Board proposes to take. The Board is fully empowered to raise or lower
the values fixed by the assessor and to grant full relief to the
complaining taxpayer.2 1 The Board must complete its work within
the two weeks' session fixed by statute. After adjournment it may
take no further action with respect to matters of valuation.22 The
"See Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165 (1898). However,
there are certain errors that the assessor may submit to a special November meeting of the County Board, REm. REV. STAT. § 11241. This Is discussed below.
"REm. REV. STAT. § 11220; the recent case of State ex rel. Yakima
Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 92 Wash. Dec. 167, 73 P. (2d) 759
(1937) supports the view that the closing date fixed by statute for meetings of the County Board is mandatory.
'°REM. REV. STAT. § 11220; see Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Spokane
County, 22 Wash. 168, 60 Pac. 132 (1900).
2"REM. REV. STAT. § 11220; but see Yakima Valley Bank and Trust Co.
v. Yakima County, 149 Wash. 552, 271 Pac. 820 (1928) in which it was
said that the aggrieved taxpayer may resort directly to the courts without
first exhausting his remedy before the County Board. The powers of
the County Board were said to be inadequate to grant full relief. If the
taxpayer does come before the County Board he will not be turned away
on the ground that he has not first resorted to the county assessor, for at
this point the matter is out of the assessor's hands, Stimson Timber Co.
v. Mason County, 112 Wash. 603, 192 Pac. 994 (1920).
"The Board meets again in November and April for certain special
purposes, REM. REV. STAT. § 11241, 11268. These matters are discussed
below.
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record of its proceedings must be filed with28 the State Board of
Equalization on the first Monday in August.
The State Board of Equalization (which is composed of the
-members of the State Tax Commission sitting as a Board of Equalization) is required to meet on the first Tuesday in September
and may remain in session for not more than twenty days. Its
task is to examine the returns from the County Boards and the
returns of the Tax Commission showing its assessment of the
24
operating properties of the public utilities under its jurisdiction.
It then proceeds to "equalize" them "so that each county . . .
.hall pay its due and just proportion of the taxes for state purposes . .. according to the ratio the valuation of the property
in each county bears to the total valuation of all property in the
-state."' 25 Its task is limited to the determination of a value to be
used as a basis for the levy of taxes for state purposes only. In
accomplishing this it may change the values of individual properties shown on the assessment roll submitted by the Tax Commission but only after giving five days written notice to the taxpayer.20 In all other cases while under the terms of the statute it
-may change the values of classes of property in practice the Board
determines a ratio that is to be applied to the values shown on the
returns of the County Boards, and this ratio, when applied to these
values, forms the basis of the levy for state purposes. It may do
this work without notice to anybody. The State Board, then, may
not change the values of individual pieces of property. 27 When
this work has been completed the results are transmitted to the
state auditor who in turn is required to transmit a record of the
proceedings to each county assessor. 28 This completes the process
-of assessment.
It thus appears that apart from the operating properties of
public utilities, the State Board has no power to deal with the value
.of any particular piece of property. Consequently, it is not in a
position to give relief to any individual taxpayer. As far as a
taxpayer is concerned, its powers are very different from those of
a County Board. 29 Its meetings are, however, fixed by statute and
.any taxpayer may be heard as to any matter falling within the
powers of the Board.
1R
. REV. STAT. § 11220.
2"REx. REV. STAT. §§ 11222, 11156-7, 11156-14.

5REzm. R Ev. STAT. § 11222.
-"REm. REV. STAT. § 11156-14.

"For a discussion of the powers of the State Board and of the manner
in which it does its work, see State ex rel Showalter v. Cook, 175 Wash.
364, 379, 27 P. (2d) 1075 (1933).
2REm. REV. STAT. § 11222-11223.
"See State ex rel Tax Commission v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P. (2d)
t619 (1932).
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At this point the taxpayer has had an opportunity to be heard
before the County Board. If he is still aggrieved he may, within
ten days after the County Board has acted, appeal to the State
Tax Commission. The record of proceedings of the County Board
must then be certified to the Tax Commission which in practice
will grant a hearing to the taxpayer. It may receive new evidence
and may make "such order as in its judgment is just and proper. "30 The statute is no more explicit than that but it seems to
be broad enough to permit the Commission to give any relief that
the matter seems to call for.31 Since the members of the Commission are the same as the members of the State Board of Equalization, the remedies available in the administrative machinery are
just the same as though the statutes permitted the taxpayer to
appeal from the County Board to the State Board and empowered
the State Board to deal with matters involving the value of particular pieces of property.
There are two other points in the administrative process at which
errors may be corrected. Between the time when the assessor has
transmitted the assessment list to the County Board in July and
the third Monday in November thereafter, the assessor may discover errors in the list. He is required to make a record of all
"errors in description, double assessments, or manifest errors in
assessment" at the time when he extends the various levies on his
rolls. This is in October and this record of errors must be filed
with the County Board on the third Monday in November, and
the Board is then reconvened for the sole purpose of considering
such errors and correcting them. This November meeting is limited
to the performance of this function. 2 It may not reopen questions
of value, but it may correct values if they are affected by errors
submitted by the assessor.
A similar meeting of the County Board is held in April. At this
meeting the County Board is reconvened for the purpose of considering similar errors that may be reported to it by the county
treasurer, and its powers are limited to the correction of such
11REm. REV. STAT. § 11092; the constitutionality of this section was

sustained in State ex rel. King County v. State Tax Commission, 174
Wash. 668, 26 P. (2d) 80 (1933); with this section must be read § 11091
par. Fifth, which requires the Commission to give notice before any
property may be added to the assessment list or the value of any listed
property may be increased.
"See In Re Jefferson County, 153 Wash. 133, 279 Pac. 392 (1929),
where the Commission reexamined and changed values fixed by a County
Board of Equalization; see also Re Metropolitan Building Co., 144 Wash.
469, 258 Pac. 473 (1927).
'REm. REV. STAT. § 11241; Stimson Timber Co. v. Mason County, 112
Wash. 603, 192 Pac. 994 (1920); Ballard v. Wooster, 182 Wash. 408, 45
P. (2d) 511 (1935).
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errors." The Board is required to make findings of fact as to
all matters that come before it at this meeting though that requirement does not seem to exist for the November meeting. Through
these two meetings the taxpayer is able to call to the attention of
the assessor or the county treasurer certain errors that apply to
his assessment and they may be corrected within the taxing machinery.
The April Board also has certain powers with respect to the
discovery and correction of false statements of personal property
made by taxpayers or the failure of the assessor to make return of
any property, or an erroneous return made by the assessor. In
such cases the Board must serve notice on the taxpayer affected
and he may be heard. The Board must make a finding.3 '
All of the above relates to the original assessment of property.
If it should turn out that any tax or any portion of any tax cannot
be collected because of some error in the original taxing process,
or is recovered back by the taxpayer after payment for some such
error, then there is a provision for the reassessment and re-levy of
the tax in the year following entry of judgment adjudging the
tax to have been void. The original taxing process is simply repeated.3 5
(b) The Levy of the Tax.
As applied to the property tax, a levy simply means the determination by some properly authorized public body of the amount
of money required to be raised for public purposes and the translation of that into a millage figure which, when applied to the
values shown on the*current assessment list of all property, will
produce the amount required. A great number and variety of
public bodies may levy taxes. No useful purpose would be served
by going through the details of the statutes as applied. to these
different bodies. It will suffice to give the barest outline of a
typical procedure. The first matter is the determination of the
amount of money to be raised. This involves the preparation of
'*REM. REV.

STAT. § 11268.
'REM REV. STAT. § 11268; see State ex rel. Lewis v. Hogg, 22 Wash.
646, 62 Pac. 143 (1900).
"REM. REV. STAT. § 11269; see Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Spokane
County, 148 Wash. 699, 270 Pac. 107 (1928); a 1931 statute sought to vest
in the State Tax Commission power to reassess any taxable property
whenever It should appear to the Commission from any protest that had
been filed at the time of payment or from any court proceeding that
challenged any tax that an error had occurred, and if the Commission
found that any assessment appeared to be excessive or void it might
proceed to reassess the property; this statute was declared unconstitutional in so far as applied to the reassessment of local or intra-county
property for purposes of local taxation, State ex rel. Tax Commission v.
Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P. (2d) 619 (1932) .but it Is still applicable for
the reassessment of the inter-county properties of public utilities.
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estimates, a tentative budget, hearings on the budget and a final
figure. This must be completed at about the time the current assessment roll has gone through the mill and the final equalized
values are available. The final budget figure must then be translated into a certain number of mills to be collected on each dollar
of the assessed values shown on the assessment rolls. There are
different millage limits that apply to different taxing bodies and
these may not be exceeded.36 When this has been done the results
are transmitted to the county assessor on or before the second
Monday in October. He extends the amount of taxes on the tax
rolls and transmits them to the county auditor, before the fifteenth
of December. At this point and within ten days after the levy
has been made and entered, any taxpayer may challenge the
validity of the levy by appealing to the State Tax Commission
and the Commission is empowered, after hearing, to affirm or
decrease the levy and the statute authoriznig this procedure makes
the action of the Commission final and conclusive.37 On the first
Monday in January, the tax rolls are transmitted to the county
treasurer and from that point on the process is one of collection.38
(c) The Collection of the Tax.
The county treasurer is the collector of all property taxes. The
procedure that he must follow is, of course, fixed by statute and
the statutes are many and their details unimportant for present
purposes. In the outline that follows, particular attention will
be given to the points at which the taxpayer becomes involved in
the machinery. Various legislative bounties of recent years to
encourage the payment of delinquent and current taxes will not
be considered. We will assume that our taxpayer is obdurate and
that the machinery for the collection of a tax must run its full
course against him or his property. The procedure for the collection of taxes on personal property is very different from that for
the collection of taxes on real property so the two must be considered separately.
As far as personal property taxes are concerned, the procedure
begins on the fifteenth day of February following the levy of the
tax39 by the mailing of notice to the taxpayer. If the taxes are not
paid when due they become delinquent,40 the county treasurer
3

1REm. REV.

STAT. § 11238, 11238-1b.
7RFm. REV. STAT. §§ 11239-11240; see § 11098 governing appeals to
the2 State Tax Commission.
1REM. REV. STAT. §§ 11243-11245.
9
REMb. REV. STAT. § 11247.
'"REM. REV. STAT. § 11244 provides that personal property taxes may
be paid in two installments on May 31st and November 30th, but failure
to pay the first installment renders the whole amount delinquent.

3
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may at once and without demand or notice distrain enough of the
taxpayer's personal property to pay the tax."' He must then post
public notice of sale of the distrained property but at least ten
days must elapse between the seizure and the sale. The taxpayer
may get his property back by paying the tax, but if he does not
pay the sale takes place. The county treasurer collects the tax out
of the proceeds and pays any balance to the owner. In all this the
taxpayer has had personal notice that a tax in a certain amount is
due, but beyond that he has had no personal notice. The notice
2
of sale is merely published.
It will be noticed that if the taxpayer has any grievance to
assert against the validity of the tax he must take the initiative
to assert it either by paying the tax under protest and asserting
his grievances in a suit to recover this amount or by attempting
to secure an injunction against the sale. 43 If the property has
been sold and delivered to the purchaser at the sale or if the property has been sold but is still in the possession of the owner, the
owner might bring replevin against the purchaser or refuse to
deliver the property to the purchaser and wait until the purchaser
seeks to replevy it from him.44 The point to be noticed is that this
machinery operates without any reference to the taxpayer. He is
not a necessary party at any point.
In the case of real property taxes the procedure is quite different. The amount of the tax is a lien on the real property and
this lien attaches on the first day of March of the year in which
11247.
'This Is the barest outline of the procedure.

"*REm. REV. STAT. §

See REm. REV. STAT.
§§ 11265, 11244-11245, 11247, 11247-1, 11248-11253, 11255-11257, 11265-11266,
11273 for the statutory provisions dealing with the collection of personal
-property taxes. In Wilberg v. Yakima County, 132 Wash. 219, 231 Pac.
931 (1925), and Mogan v.Larson, 183 Wash. 287, 48 P. (2d) 621 (1935),
the court was at pains to lay down certain rules that must be observed.
Thus, the amount of the tax isa personal obligation of the owner of the
property; the tax is to be collected by distraint of the property taxed if
he still-owns it at the time of collection; if he no longer owns that
property the tax may be collected as a -lien upon the other personal or
real property owned and there are problems considered in those cases
relating to the collection of the tax out of the personal property assessed
when it has passed into other ownership. See also B. J. WHEELON, The
Lien of Personal Property Taxes in Washington, 2 WAsH. L. REV. 186
(1925).
"Johnston v. Whatcom County, 27 Wash. 95, 67 Pac. 569 (1902), was
a case of payment under protest to avoid seizure and sale of property,
while Wilberg v. Yakima County, 132 Wash. 219, 231 Pac. 931 (1925) was
a case of an injunction against the sale. No doubt the 1931 antI-injunction statute, to be considered later, would prohibit this remedy today.
"Mogan v. Larson, 183 Wash. 287, 48 P. (2d) 621 (1935) 'was an action
of replevin against the owner who had refused to deliver possession to
the purchaser at the sale. Doubtless the same questions that were raised
in that case could be raised in an action of replevin brought by the owner
against the purchaser. In this type of action the attack on the tax collection proceedings is, of course, collateral.
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the taxes are levied. 45 The process of collection begins on February fifteenth and the usual practice is to mail a statement to
the taxpayer showing the amount due. 48 The tax may be paid in
two installments on May 31st and November 30th, and if not paid
it becomes delinquent. Eleven months after any tax has become
delinquent the Board of County Commissioners may decide to
issue a certificate of delinquency to any person who pays the
amount of the delinquent tax, but this is rarely done.4 7 The purchaser of the certificate may do nothing until the expiration of three
years from the original date of delinquency of the tax covered by
his certificate. After that he may proceed to foreclose the lien of the
tax. This must be done in the Superior Court of the county in which
the land is located and the owner of the land must be served with
notice. 48 If any property remains on the tax rolls with taxes
charged against it which have been delinquent for five years and
against which certificates of delinquency have not been issued and
sold, then the county treasurer issues certificates of delinquency
to the county and the county may at once proceed to foreclose
them in the same manner as the private holder of a certificate
proceeds, except that the county need only publish notice of the
foreclosure.49 From this it is evident that the procedure for the
collection of real property taxes involves the issuance of a certificate of delinquency, either by sale to a private person or by issuance to the county, and the foreclosure of the lien of the tax by
the certificate holder. The proceedings in the Superior Court
proceed to judgment for the amount of the taxes due, interest and
costs, together with an order of sale of the property. The county
treasurer must publish notice of the tax judgment sale and after
the sale he issues a tax deed to the successful bidder.5 0 If the sale
is of property covered by a certificate of delinquency held by a
county and if no bids are received, then the county automatically
takes title51 and the county may then sell the property that it has
acquired in this way.2 The property may be redeemed at any
time before the issuance of the tax deed or by minors and insane
persons within three years thereafter.58
l8REm. REV. STAT. §§ 11260, 11265; query, while the statutes are specific
it may be that the recent change in the date as of which the assessed
value is to be determined from March 1 to January 1, see Laws 1937, ch. 122,
REm. REV. STAT. § 11112-1 may carry with It a change in the date of the
attachment of the lien. As between grantor and grantee the lien does
not attach until the first Monday of February of the succeeding year.
"REm. REV. STAT. § 11245.
sREm.REV. STAT. § 11274.
4 EM,. REV. STAT.
"1REm. REV. STAT.
10REm. REV. STAT.
5

§ 11276.
§ 11278.
§ 11281.

'REM. REV. STAT. § 11290.
2REm. REV. STAT. § 11294.

5REm. REV. STAT.

§ 11280.
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Unlike the machinery for the collection of the personal property
tax, this machinery gives the taxpayer an opportunity to present
his grievances to the court -before there can be any sale of the land.
The statute directs the court to proceed in a summary manner in
these cases but still the taxpayer may present any defense he may
have. The statute does, however, weigh the proceedings pretty
heavily against the taxpayer for it is specifically provided that
certain possible defenses will be without avail. Most of these relate
to informalities or irregularities in the original proceedings that
resulted in the tax, and since these took place more than three
years before the foreclosure proceedings, it is only right that time
should iron out what might be termed technical defenses." From
the judgment of the trial court there may be an appeal to the
Supreme Court. 5 The defenses that the taxpayer may raise in
these proceedings will be considered more fully below.
Judicial Remedies After Payment of a Tax: Priorto the 1931
Anti-Injunction Statute
It is well settled that if a taxpayer voluntarily pays any tax he
may not later sue to recover the amount paid and it matters not
whether he claims that the tax so paid was utterly void 8 or
merely that it was excessive in amount, 57 or that payment was made
under a misapprehension of a matter of law5" or of fact 59 that was
not corrected or discovered until after payment had been made.
This is a doctrine of repose. The public revenues must not be disturbed by taxpayers whose grievances are after-thoughts. If taxpayers have any grievances let them 'assert them before payment or
at least at the time of payment so that there will be notice to the
public treasury that claims may be asserted against it. There can
be no quarrel with this policy when it is applied to a taxpayer
who should know his grievance at the time of payment but when
it is applied in cases where payment is made in good faith but
",REm REV. STAT. § 11281 details the irregularities that will be overlooked or corrected by the court.
5REm. REV. STAT. § 11282.
"Phelps v. Tacoma, 15 Wash. 367, 46 Pac. 400 (1896) recovery denied
because of voluntary payment of taxes though they were not a legal
charge against the property taxed; Pacific Finance Co. v. Spokane County,
170 Wash. 101, 15 P. (2d) 652 (1932) recovery denied where taxes were
paid pursuant to a statute later found to be unconstitutional.
"Pittock & Leadbetter Lumber Co. v. Skamania County, 98 Wash. 145,
167 Pac. 108 (1917) recovery denied where taxpayer claimed that taxes
were based on excessive valuation.
"Childs v. Spokane County, 100 Wash. 64, 170 Pac. 145 (1918); Robinson v. Kittitas County, 101 Wbash. 422, 172 Pac. 553 (1918) in both cases
the mistake was as to the ownership by the taxpayer of the property taxed.
"Peterson v. Jefferson County, 167 Wash. 269, 9 P. (2d) 73 (1932)
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under a mistake that is not discoverable until after payment there
is little to be said in its favor.
The statement of the foregoing doctrine has always been tempered with the proposition that if the payment had been made
under protest the case would be different. Prior to the 1931
statute, words of protest at the time of payment were enough to
permit a suit to recover the amount paid6" and no special form
of words was required nor did the taxpayer have to specify the
grounds of his protest."' The changes in all this that were made
by the 1931 statute will be considered later. The protest, of course,
must be made to the officer to whom payment is made.2 Even if
where taxes had 'been paid based on a county cruise of timber lands that
was later found to have been excessive to the extent of 1,300,000 feet of
timber; it is hard to reconcile this with the earlier case of Puget Realty
Co. v. King County, 50 Wash. 349, 97 Pac. 226 (1908), in which the taxpayer owned 12 acres of land but through a mistake of the assessor he

was assessed for 22 acres.

The taxpayer did not discover the mistake

until after payment. The court allowed recovery even though the mistake
was an honest one on the part of the assessor. The court was impressed
with the fact that the mistake resulted in practically a double assessment
and that this was not a mere inadvertence, but materially affected the

rights of the taxpayer. The over-assessment was even greater in Peterson
v. Jefferson County, but the cases might be reconciled if importance is
attached to the fact that in the Peterson case the taxpayer himself might
have cruised his own land and ascertained how much timber there was on
it and he had not done so.

The mistake there was a mutual one whereas

in the Puget Realty Company case the only mistake was that of the
assessor, and the taxpayer under the facts in that case had no way of
knowing about it until after he had paid the tax.
'In an early case, Montgomery v. Cowlitz County, 14 Wash. 230, 44
Pac. 259 (1896) it was held that words of protest were not enough. Such
a payment was said to be voluntary unless it was made at a time when
the tax collection machinery was in full operation and the taxpayer's land
was about to be sold. A payment at that time would be involuntary and
need not be accompanied by words of protest. Changes in the tax collection machinery made it impossible for any steps to be taken to enforce
collection for at least three years after delinquency so if this decision
stood it would drive the taxpayer to other remedies before payment to

adjudicate the validity of the lien of the tax. He would have a long
time to wait before he could pay the tax under circumstances that would
permit him to assert his grievances in a suit to recover the amount paid.
This case was overruled in T.ozer v. Skagit County, 34 Wash. 147, 75 Pac.

638 (1904); see also Wyckoff v. King County, 18 Wash. 256, 51 Pac. 379
(1897) in which the doctrine of the Montgomery case was not applied
when the taxpayer paid under protest before the tax collection machinery
had started operation in order to gain the advantage of a legislative remission of penalty and interest on taxes paid before a certain date. Tozer
v. Skagit was followed in Owings v. Olympia, 88 Wash. 289, 152 Pac. 1019

(1915) and Stimson Timber Co. v. Mason County, 97 Wash. 205, 166 Pac.
251 (1917).
"Byram v. Thurston County, 141 Wash. 28, 41, 251 Pac. 103, 252 Pac.
943 (1926); Corwin Investment Co. v. White, 166 Wash. 195, 6 P. (2d)
607 (1932); Northwestern etc. Hypotheekbank v. Adams County, 174

Wash. 447, 24 P. (2d) 1086 (1933); but the failure to use formal words
of protest at the time of payment will bar recovery, Pacific Finance Co.
v. Spokane County, 170 Wash. 101, 15 P. (2d)

652 (1932).

"See Byram v. Thurston County, 151 Wash. 28, 251 Pac. 103, 252 Pac.

943 (1926)

in which a payment was made under protest to the county

treasurer but the county officers were without any power to correct the
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a payment has been made without protest the courts have allowed
recovery in some cases where it could be said that the payment
was under duress or compulsion, 3 but these are not likely to have
any application to property taxes.
JudicialRemedies Before Payment of a Taz: Priorto the 1931
Anti-Injunction Statute
A taxpayer may wish to secure a judicial determination of the
validity or proper amount of a tax before he pays it. Unless the
taxing machinery makes this possible by making available a
statutory appeal to the courts the taxpayer must resort to other
procedural devices to get his grievances before a court. The courts
must then determine the availability of different types of actions
in tax cases for unless the legislature has spoken on the subject
the courts are free to do so. The Legislature did provide a statutory
appeal to the courts in 1925 but withdrew it in 1931, 64 so this is
mentioned only to be put aside. We will be concerned with other
procedural devices that were developed by the courts in tax cases
prior to the 1931 statute.
(a) Injunction and Other Equitable Remedies.
The use of the bill in equity to enjoin the collection of a tax
grievance that provoked the protest because it related to an excessive
valuation of property assessed by the state and not by the county assessor,
i. e., the operating property of a railroad. The court held the protest to
'be sufficient.
"Olympia Brewing Co. v. State, 102 Wash. 494, 173 Pac. 430 (1918),
where annual license fees to operate a brewery and to sell liquor were
paid without protest even though the continuance of the business would
become illegal before the year was up. Recovery was allowed on the
ground that the payments were made under compulsion to prevent the
sacrifice of large capital investments. In Union Bag & Paper Corp. v.
State, 160 Wash. 538, 295 Pac. 748 (1931), a corporation paid license fees
and filing fees without protest. The court found coercion or duress in
the "threats of the statutes" (at p. 542) that imposed certain penalties
and disabilities on corporations that did not pay these fees. These were
a serious threat to the business rights of the corporation. There Is no
comparable compulsion In the property tax machinery and the court has
always required some words of protest to take the payment out of the
class of a voluntary payment. See also Bart v. Pierce County, 60 Wash.
507, 111 Pac. 582 (1910), in which recovery was allowed of a portion of
an annual county liquor license that became inoperative during the year
for which it was issued. The court simply said that "the great principles
of natural justice and common honesty" required the allowance of recovery. This stands as an isolated case.
"REm. REv. STAT. § 11097 permitted an aggrieved tax-payer to appeal
from an order of the State Tax Commission to a Superior Court, see Re
Metropolitan Building Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 Pac. 473 (1927), but this
was repealed In 1931, Laws of 1931, p. 204, see Re Yakima Amusement
Co., 92 Wash. Dec. 163, 73 P. (2d) 519 (1937). Prior to the 1925 statute
the court had held at an early date than an appeal from a taxing body
to a Superior Court would not lie under any general appeal statute and
therefore was not available unless specifically granted by statute, Olympia
Water Works v. Thurston County, 14 Wash. 268, 44 Pae. 267 (1896);
Knapp v. King County, 15 Wash. 541, 46 Pac. 1047 (1896).
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alleged to be illegal in whole or in part goes back to early days and
was in part governed by statute. A territorial act of 1888 prohibited the use of the injunction in tax cases unless the taxpayer
first paid or tendered all taxes "justly due and unpaid" on the
property involved, and the statute also had something to say
about the contents of the complaint in such actions. It will be
noticed that under the language of the statute there was no requirement of tender if the taxpayer sought his injunction against
the assessment of his property or at any time before "the collection" began. 5 It almost goes without saying that until the adoption of the Anti-Injunction statute of 1931 this was the most popular procedural device whereby taxpayers brought tax matters
before the courts. It would serve no useful purpose to collect and
consider the large number of cases in which this procedural device
has been employed. 6 The injunction was available in personal
property tax cases. In these cases where, as we have seen, collection proceeds at once following delinquency the bill was directed
against the seizure and sale of the property. Here the claim of
the inadequacy of the remedy at law, except, of course, payment
67
under protest, had more force than in the real property cases.
And the injunction seems to have been available at any stage of
the process of collection. It has been used to prevent the commenceR Em. REV. STAT. §§ 955-957; see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wooster,
178 Wash. 180, 34 P. (2d) 451 (1934) for an example of a case in which
an injunction was sought at a time when no tender was required under
the statute.
"Some typical cases are Andrews v. King County, 1 Wash. 46, 23 Pac.
409 (1890); Bonn v. Chehalis County, 11 Wash. 134, 39 Pac. 365 (1895),
in which the argument that there was an adequate remedy at law in proceedings to collect the tax was met with the statement that it was a
hardship on the taxpayer to have to wait for several years before he
could take any steps, short of payment under protest, to remove the cloud
of the tax; Knapp v. King County, 17 Wash. 567, 50 Pac. 480 (1897) in
which the foregoing argument as to the inadequacy of the legal remedy
was apparently forgotten for here the taxpayer was permitted to direct
his bill against the commencement of proceedings to collect the tax by
foreclosure and, of course, he was entitled to assert his grievances in
those proceedings; see also Eureka District Gold Mining Co. v. Ferry
County, 28 Wash. 250, 68 Pac. 727 (1902); Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v.
Pierce County, 55 Wash. 108, 104 Pac. 178 (1909); Doty Lumber & Shingle
Co. v. Lewis County, 60 Wash. 428, 111 Pac. 562 (1910); Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 70 Wash. 48, 126 Pac. 54 (1912); Samish
Gun Club v. Skagit County, 118 Wash. 578, 204 Pac. 181 (1922); Finch v.
Grays Harbor County, 121 Wash. 486, 209 Pac. 833 (1922); Woodburn v.
Skagit County, 120 Wash. 58, 206 Pac. 834 (1922); Willapa Electric Co.
v. Pacific County, 160 Wash. 412, 295 Pac. 152 (1931).
OlTypical cases in which the Injunction has been employed in personal
property tax cases are Phelan v. Smith, 22 Wash. 397, 61 Pac. 31 (1900);
Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Chehalis County, 24 Wash. 626, 64 Pac. 787
(1901); Scandinavian-American Bank v. Pierce County, 20 Wash. 155,
55 Pac. 40 (1898); Pullman State Bank v. Manring, 18 Wash. 250, 51 Pac.
464 (1897); Mills v. Thurston County, 16 Wash. 378, 47 Pac. 759 (1897);
Wil erg v. Yakima County, 132 Wash. 219, 231 Pae. 931 (1925).
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ment of foreclosure of the tax lien and the public sale that would
follow,6 8 and it has even been employed after sale to attempt to
have the sale set aside and prevent the issuance of a tax deed
to the purchaser.6 9 It has also been used to test the power of a
70
public body to make a particular levy.
Another form of action that was frequently employed was an
action to reduce the assessed value of a piece of property.71 In
this action the taxpayer prayed for an order of the court fixing
the value of the property. The proceeding was likened to an action
to remove a cloud on title and has been said to be of equitable
cognizance.72 It has been further assimilated with the injunction
cases in requiring the taxpayer to make a tender of the amount
justly due, but only, of course, if the action was brought at a
78
time when a tender was required. under the statute.
A bill to remove a cloud on title to property is very much like
the actions discussed above. Such an action has been brought by
one claiming ownership against anyone claiming an adverse interest in the property and the tax claim was treated as such an
adverse interest.7" While this action has been employed against
taxing authorities, it seems to have had its greatest utility in
actions between private parties in which one party asserted his
title against one claiming under a tax deed or the holder of a
tax deed sought to maintain its validity against the claim of another. In these cases the regularity of the proceedings which resulted in the assessment and levy of the tax and of the foreclosure
"See Knapp v. King County, 17 Wash. 567, 50 Pac. 480 (1897).

OHeath v. McCrea, 20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432 (1898).
"Wingate v. Ketner, 8 Wash. 94, 35 Pac. 591 (1894).
"Typical cases in which this remedy has been employed are Landes
Estate Co. v. Clallam County, 19 Wash. 569, 53 Pac. 670 (1898); Templeton v. Pierce County, 25 Wash. 377, 65 Pac. 553 (1901); Stimson Timber
Co. v. Mason County, 112 Wash. 603, 192 Pac. 994 (1902); Henderson v.
Pierce County, 37 Wash. 201, 79 Pac. 617 (1905); Dickson v. Kittitas
County, 42 Wash. 429, 84 Pac. 855 (1906); Savage v. Pierce County, 68
Wash. 623, 123 Pac. 1088 (1912); Norpia Realty Co. v. Thurston County,
131 Wash. 675, 231 Pac. 13 (1924); Inland Empire Land Co. v. Grant
County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14 (1926); Inland Empire Land Co. v.
Douglas County, 149 Wash. 253, 270 Pac. 812 (1928).
"Inland Empire Land Co. v. Douglas County, 149 Wash. 253, 270 Pac.
812 (1928).
"Mountain Timber Co. v. Cowlitz County, 163 Wash. 543, 2 P. (2d)
69 (1931).
TREm. REv. STAT. § 785; Kinsman v. Spokane, 20 Wash. 118, 54 Pac.
934 (1898); Miller v. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 110, 68 Pac. 358 (1902);
this action could be maintained even though the tax lien was, for some
reason, unenforceable and the taxing authority did even assert the validity
of the lien. Cushing v. Spokane, 45 Wash. 193, 87 Pac. 1121 (1906); but
It was intimated In one case that if the invalidity of -the tax lien was ap
parent on the tax record there would be no cloud on title but if the defect
depended on some showing dehors -the tax record, then there was enough
of a cloud to support an action to remove it. See Montgomery v. Cowlitz
County, 14 Wash. 230, 44 Pac. 259 (1896).
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proceedings and the purchase of the tax deed at public sale were
subjected to collateral attack. 5 This type of action, too, was
subject to the same requirements of the statute as to tender. 76
The statutory requirement of a tender was broadly construed to
apply to "all actions or proceedings attacking the legality of any
tax"," and in that way the last two forms of action in which
an injunction, as such, was not asked for were brought within
the statute. After all, the relief asked for was substantially the
same, that is, a judicial determination of the amount of the tax
that was properly collectible, and it mattered not whether the
final order of the court enjoined the taxing authorities from collecting more than a certain amount or whether it fixed the proper
amount and in that way prevented the collection of any more, or
whether it directed that the cloud of the lien be removed entirely
or in part. The final effect was the same, no matter how the taxpayer pleaded his case or the court fashioned its order.
In the cases in which a tender was required the court was not
strict as to the tender itself. The taxpayer was required to tender
the amount "justly due", but it rested with him to determine that
amount. Of course, if the taxpayer contended that the whole tax
was void, then no tender was required, for it was the taxpayer's
position that nothing was "justly due". 7 8 If he tendered less
than what was finally found by the court to be due the difference
was simply charged to him in the final bill of costs. 9 But there
had to be a tender of some sort and it was not excused on the
ground that in advance of making it the tax collector had said
that he would not accept any tender. ° If the tax collector made
that statement the taxpayer was still required to make his tender
and if it was refused the taxpayer had only to show the refusal
and he had complied with the requirement.8
"See Vestal v. Morris, 11 Wash. 451, 39 Pac. 960 (1895); McManus v.
Morgan, 38 Wash. 528, 80 Pac. 786 (1905); there are many more cases of
such collateral attacks, and in some instances, as in Washington Timber
Co. v. Smith, 34 Wash. 625, 76 Pac. 267 (1904), the action was described
as one to cancel a tax deed for certain irregularities.
"Miller v. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 110, 68 Pac. 358 (1902).
"Mountain Timber Co. v. Cowlitz County, 163 Wash. 543, 2 P. (2d) 69
(1931).
"gHowell v. Tacoma, 3 Wash. 711, 29 Pac. 447 (1892); Kinsman v. Spokane, 20 Wash. 118, 54 Pac. 934 (1898); Lewiston Water & Power Co. v.
Asotin County, 24 Wash. 371, 64 Pac. 544 (1901).
"Landes Estate Co. v. Clallain County, 19 Whash. 569, 53 Pac. 670
(1898); see also Norpia Realty Corp. v. Thurston County, 131 Wash. 675,
231 Pac. 13 (1924) where the tender was substantially less than the
amount found by the court to be due.
"Old Republic Mining Co. v. Ferry County, 69 Wash. 600, 125 Pac.
1018 (1912).
81Inland Empire Land Co. v. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac.
14 (1926).
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(b) Extraordinary Writs.
1. Certiorarior Review:
There was a time when it looked as though this writ might
become an important procedural device for invoking judicial review of at least some of the actions of taxing officers and boards,
but it was not long before its limitations were recognized and even
before the 1931 statute it was of little importance. This story may
be briefly told. The statutory writ 2 may be issued by any court
when any inferior tribunal, board or officer "exercising judicial
functions" has exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally or "to
correct any erroneous or void proceeding" and no appeal is otherwise provided and there is no adequate remedy at law. Once the
writ has been properly issued the scope of judicial review is fixed
by statute and it is broad enough to cover most any error in the
taxing process.3
The court had little difficulty in deciding that this writ might
issue from the Superior Court to a Board of Equalization. It was
satisfied that such a board exercised a "judicial function" within
the meaning of the statute and a cursory review of a few other
remedies convinced the judges that the taxpayer had no adequate
remedy at law. 84 In two cases in 1911 and 1913, both involving the
valuation of the Metropolitan Building Company lease, the court
passed on the question "whether the lease has been properly valued", that is, what basis should be used in determining value for
tax purposes, 85 but it was not long before the court faced squarely
the limitations of this writ and dashed whatever hopes taxpayers
may have derived from the Metropolitan Building Company cases.
In 1913 the court made it plain that the function of the writ was
to bring before the reviewing court only the record made before
the taxing officer or board and that it did not involve any new
evidence being taken in court. This limitation had important consequences, for the court in reviewing such a record would only be
in a position to decide whether the record was sufficient to sustain
or 1895, p. 114; REm. Rv. STAT. §§ 999-1012.
3REm. REv. STAT. § 1010.

"LAws

"Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165 (1898), in this early decision the court Invalidated action by a Board of Equalization in raising
the assessed value of land without the necessary statutory written notice
to the taxpayer and also invalidated the action of an assessor in changing
an assessment after the assessment roll had been filed with the Board
of Equalization; see also Ladd v. Gilson, 26 Wash. 79, 66 Pac. 126 (1901)
and Everett Water Co. v. Fleming, 26 Wash. 364, 67 Pac. 82 (1901) in
which the sufficiency of notice given by a Board of Equalization to taxpayers was reviewed by writ of certiorari. Query as to the standing of
these cases today, see -particularly Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce
County, 133 Wash. 355, 233 Pac. 922 (1925).
'sMetropolitan Building Co. v. King County, 64 Wash. 615, 117 Pao.
495 (1911); id. 72 Wash. 47, 129 Pae.-883 (1913).
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the particular tax. If it was not, the court could not receive new
evidence and fix a proper valuation for tax purposes unless perchance there was evidence in the record that would support some
finding by the court. If there was no such evidence in the record
the court could not remand the matter to the Board of Equalization
because such boards sit only for a definite statutory period and
then adjourn. In short, there would be no properly constituted
board to which the question could be remanded. There would be
no way in which the court could compel a board to reassemble.
Faced with this situation, the court simply decided that the writ
of certiorari would not lie to review a determination of value by a
8
Board of Equalization or other taxing officer.
This disposition of the writ of certiorari was tempered by the
court when it pointed out at some length that an original action
on the equity side of the court would not be met by these difficulties.
A bill in equity, the court said, was the only practical remedy
available to a taxpayer, for in such a proceeding the court could
pass on the alleged arbitrary and unlawful action of a taxing
officer or Board of Equalization and could hear evidence bearing
on the question of the proper valuation of the taxpayer's property. 7 This was reiterated in a case decided a few years later
when the court made it clear that it made no difference whether
the record contained no evidence or whether it was merely incom8
plete. In either case the writ of certiorari would not lie.1 This
position was reaffirmed in 1926 and the court said that even though
the record before the court was such as to make possible the determination of a proper value, it would not act because it had no
89
The matter would have
way of making its judgment effective.
"State ex rel. S. & I. E. R. R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 75
Wash. 90, 134 Pac. 695 (1913). The court distinguished Lewis v. Bishop,
supra, on the ground that there the court simply set aside the action
taken by the Board of Equalization because of lack of notice and with
this set aside, it simply left the value fixed by the county assessor in
effect and in this way the court was in a position to render an effective
judgment on the record before it; the Metropolitan Building Co. cases,
supra, note 85, and two other cases were disposed of on the ground that
the procedural question had not been raised and it was also said that the
record was such that an effective judgment could be rendered though
this last point is none too clear.
8
1State ex rel. S. & I. E. R. R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
supra, note 86.
State ex rel. Oregon-Washington R. R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, 82 Wash.
1,143 Pac. 312 (1914).
"State ex rel. N. P. R. R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 140 Wash.
243, 248 Pac. 793 (1926); the difficulty seems to have been that in a
certiorari case the court was dealing only with the record made before
the Board of Equalization, and when the court had acted on that record
it had to go back to the Board, for it -was the Board's record, and the
corrected record simply took the place of the original one in the tax collection process; since the Board had adjourned there was no way of
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passed beyond the jurisdiction of the Board of Equalization before
the writ issued. It followed that there was no way by which the
judgment of the court as to a proper valuation could be made
effective in the machinery of tax collection. The court's views
would be simply advisory since the issue had become moot by
reason of the Board of Equalization having adjourned.90
This writ may be issued by the Supreme Court originally 9' and
one attempt to secure such an original writ is worthy of note. A
county taxpayer applied for a writ directed to the State Board of
Equalization to call up the record of certain proceedings by which
the Board had raised the total valuation of the taxable property
of the state. The taxpayer contended that the State Board had
no authority to do this and sought by this writ to have its proceedings declared to have been null and void. The court denied
the application for the writ but did so after passing on the merits
of the question raised and concluding that the State Board did
have authority to do what it had done. No question was raised
as to the propriety of this writ.92 In this kind of a case if the court
had determined that the State Board had no authority to act, its
order would have declared the proceedings of the State Board to
have been null and void and there would be no difficulty in making
this order effective. It is true that the Board would have adjourned, but the effect of the court order would be to make the
tax collection machinery operate as though the Board had never
acted on the matter, that is, collection would go ahead on the basis
of values fixed by county assessors and County Boards of Equalization.
2. Mandamus or.Mandate.
Like the writ or review of certiorari, the writ of mandamus or
substituting the corrected one for the original one; in the equity cases,

on the other hand, the court was dealing with the record made In court
and its final order would be addressed to the officers engaged in the
collection process and would enjoin them from collecting more than was
shown to be due under the court's order.
01W-hat of Lewis v. Bishop and other early cases Involving this writ?
Their authority is severely shaken by these later cases though they have
never been overruled. They simply have not been followed. In a recent
case that presented a set of facts very similar to the facts in Lewis v.
Bishop the right of a taxpayer to maintain a bill in equity was resisted
on the ground that the remedy at law was adequate, i. e., by writ of
certiorari as in Lewis v. Bishop. The court rejected this defense saying
that the relief sought was based in part upon facts not shown on the
face of the record made by the Board of Equalization, and in this state
of affairs the writ of certiorari would not be available and a bill in
equity would be the only practical remedy to the taxpayer (Weyerhaeuser
Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 355, 233 Pac. 922 (1925)). This
does not Involve overruling Lewis v. Bishop on the procedural point, but
there is little, If anything, left of it. Presumably a taxpayer, proceeding
by writ of certiorari, would be told the same thing. He should be.
O'CONSTrrUION OF WASHINGToN,

Art. IV,

§

4.

"State ex rel. Thompson v. Nichols, 29 Wash. 159, 69 Pac. 771 (1902).
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mandate is both statutory

94

The constitu-

and constitutional.

tional writ may be issued only on original application to the Supreme Court and may be directed only to "state

officers", while

the statutory writ may be issued by any court except a justice's or
a police court "to any inferior tribunal, corporation or person, to

compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station ...

"95

This writ is of limited utility in tax matters, but it does have

certain uses. Like other extraordinary remedies, it may be issued
only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law,96 but this requirement has been honored in the breach as much
as in the observance. In one case the county assessor was required
to spread certain values fixed by statute on the assessment rolls
as applied to lands that were certified to him as reforestation
lands. He refused to do this and claimed that the statute was unconstitutional.

Since the statutory values were lower than those

fixed by the county assessor a taxpayer sought by writ of mandamus to compel the assessor to spread the statutory values on

the assessment rolls. The court entertained jurisdiction and passed
on the constitutional question even though there were other rem97

edies available to the taxpayer.

The court did not even consider

the point, yet in an earlier case the use of this extraordinary writ
8
Of course, there may be inwas denied on that very ground.
'OREm. REV. STAT. §§ 1013-1026.
"CoNSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON, Art. IV,

§ 4.
REV. STAT. § 1014.
'REm. REV. STAT. § 1015.
"State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P.
(2d) 539 (1934); taxes levied on the values fixed by the assessor might
have been paid under protest or the taxpayer might have sought to
enjoin the assessments as resulting in a void tax and in both types of
action the validity of the statutory values would have -been necessarily
involved; State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132,
6 P. (2d) 619 (1932) Is much the same type of case; here the commission
had reassessed certain local property under REm. REV. STAT. §§ 11301-11307
and the value fixed by it was lower than the value fixed by the county
assessor; the assessor refused to enter it on his assessment roll, claiming
that the statute under which the Commission had reassessed the property
was unconstitutional; the commission sought to compel the assessor to
make the entry by writ of mandamus but it did not issue since the court
held the statute to be invalid; note that there, too, the taxpayer would
have his remedy when the tax based on the higher value of the assessor
was sought to be collected; see also State ex rel. Ross v. Headlee, 22
Wash. 126, 60 Pac. 126 (1900), where county commissioners made a second
and lower levy than had been originally certified to the county assessor
and by writ of mandamus they sought to require the assessor to extend
the lower levy on the tax rolls. The writ issued even though there were
other remedies available to taxpayers yet mandamus was a useful device
because the question affected all taxpayers in the county and it was
desirable that it -be settled.
"State ex rel. Godfrey v. Turner, 113 Wash. 214, 193 Pac. 715 (1920).
The constitutional writ was denied 'where a taxpayer sought to compel a

9R11r.

TAXPAYERS' REMEDIES

111

stances in which the writ of mandamus is really the only effective
remedy for a private litigant. If the statute requires the performance of a particular act and the officer charged with its performance simply refuses to perform and the litigant has no other
remedy, then the writ of mandamus has its greatest utility. There
is then the question as to whether the act, the performance of
which is sought to be compelled by the writ, is ministerial, in which
case the writ may issue, or whether it is discretionary, in which
case the writ may not issue.99 In tax cases the writ has issued to
compel tax officers to perform certain specific duties imposed by
statute100 and the tax officer may put in issue the validity of the
statute which imposes the duty.101
This writ is useful in one other type of case. If a statute requires
tax officers to act in a way that imposes heavier burdens on taxpayers and the tax officers, for any reason, refuse to act under
the statute, the chances are that taxpayers will not object. If the
duty imposed by the statute is plain the court has issued the writ
to the obdurate tax officers at the instance of the attorney general
02
of the state.
In a recent case the court seemed to feel that the writ might
issue to a tax body to require it to expunge from its records certain proceedings that it had taken on the ground that the proceedcounty treasurer to accept a tender of taxes and issue a receipt, the taxpayer claiming that the amount tendered was in full payment of all taxes
justly due, whereas the amount levied was illegal and in excess of the
statutory millage limit. The court pointed to the other remedies available
to the taxpayer, such as payment under protest, injunction, action to
quiet title due to an over-assessment or to cancel excessive and fraudulent
taxes. With these roads open to -him there was no need for a writ of
mandamus.
"Cases in which consideration is given to the use of the writ to compel
the levy of a tax or to collect a special assessment or to pay warrants,
and the like are not considered. See, for example, Portland Savings Bank
v. Montesano, 14 Wash. 570, 45 Pac. 158 (1896); State ex rel. Olmstead
v. Mudgett, 21 Wash. 99, 57 Pac. 351 (1899); Bacon v. Tacoma, 19 Wash.
674, 54 Pac. 609 (1898); State Savings Bank v. Davis, 22 Wash. 406, 61
Pac. 43 (1900); State v. Asotin County, 79 Whsh. 634, 140 Pac.-914 (1914).
"'State ex rel. McClaine v. Reed, 29 Wash. 383, 69 Pac. 1096 (1902),
to compel county treasurer to furnish a taxpayer with a statement of
the amount of taxes due so that he might pay them and redeem his
property; State ex rel. Race v. Cranney, 30 Wash. 594, 71 Pac. 50 (1902),
to compel county treasurer to issue a tax deed, writ denied on the merits;
see also Ballard v. Wooster, 182 Wash. 408, 45 P. (2d) 511 (1935) for a
recent discussion of certain duties of an assessor as being ministerial.
=State ex rel. American Savings Union v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447,
50 Pac. 119 (1897), here a county treasurer refused to issue a delinquent
tax certificate pursuant to a statute requiring him to issue a certificate
on tender of the amount of the delinquent taxes; the amount was tendered
and by writ of mandamus the validity of the statute rwas passed on; note
that here this writ was the only remedy open to the litigant.
'State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996
(1926) to compel the -State Board of Equalization to levy a tax pursuant
to statute; State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 2 P. (2d)
653 (1931) is much the same type of case.
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ings were unconstitutional."' The writ did not issue because
the court sustained the validity of the questioned proceedings, but
if the writ had issued, and the court went so far as to say that it
had the power to issue it, there would have been an utter distortion
of the basis on which the writ issues. Perhaps the court would say
that it is a plain duty on public officers to expunge unconstitutional
proceedings from their records. It will be up to the court to point
to the source of such a duty. It can point to no statute. If the tax
officer is refusing to perform a duty imposed on him by statute
and contends that the statute is unconstitutional the situation is
quite different. The writ, ifit issues, simply compels him to perform his statutory duties. In the case under discussion the writ
direcis the tax officer to expunge certain proceedings from his
records. Injunction or the writ of prohibition are appropriate
104
for this purpose.
3. Prohibition.
The writ of prohibition is defined by statute as the counterpart
of the writ of mandamus. It is designed to arrest the proceedings
of any "tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person. ' '105 Like other extraordinary
remedies it is not available if some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law is open. When the constitutional question is
raised it is easy enough to bring the proceeding within the language
of the statute for the claim then is that the board or officer is acting
without jurisdiction. In one case in which a constitutional issue
was raised the position of this writ as the counterpart of the writ
of mandamus is well illustrated. The writ was directed to a county
assessor to prohibit him from allowing certain exemptions fixed by
statute, the claim being that the statute was unconstitutional. The
03State ex rel. King County v. State Tax Commission, 174 Wash. 336,
24 P. (2d) 1094 (1933), here King County sought a constitutional writ
of mandamus to compel the State Tax Commission to expunge from its
records proceedings already taken which had resulted in a reassessment
of the Inter-county operating property of a railroad. The reassessment
was at a lower value than had been originally fixed. The writ did not
issue because the court concluded that the statute under which the commission had reassessed this property was constitutional. Note that the
taxpayer here did not object to the reassessment because it was at a lower
figure but King County was seeking to reinstate the earlier higher figure.
1"'4f. State ex rel. Chamberlin v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 49 Pac. 243
(1897) where the writ of prohibition was issued to prevent a county
assessor from allowing certain exemptions fixed by statute. The statute
was found to be unconstitutional. Here the assessor had acted affirmatively in allowing exemptions under the statute. Under the theory of
State ex rel. King County v. State Tax Commission, supra, the writ of
mandamus would have directed the assessor to expunge the unconstitutional exemptions from his tax rolls.
"'REM. REv. STAT. §§ 1027-1033.
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assessor was plainly performing the duty imposed on him by the
statute, yet the performance of that duty eased the burden on the
taxpayers so that they were not likely to complain. The writ
proved to be a useful device for bringing this constitutional issue
into court.10 There is always the question as to the availability and
adequacy of remedies at law and when a tax officer or board is
acting in a way that will impose some burden on taxpayers there
are available remedies and resort to this writ should not be necessary.
The writ is plainly designed to be used to determine whether a
given person or body is acting within or in excess of its jurisdiction and in tax matters this gives it a very limited utility. Thus,
it has been used to determine whether a board of equalization is
properly constituted,'0 7 but if a tax officer is acting within his
powers the writ is not available. 108
(c) Defenses Available in Proceedings to Collect Taxes.
We have seen that the collection of the real property tax involves
judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of the tax lien in a suit
brought by a holder of a certificate of delinquency. In those proceedings anyone interested in the land subject to the lien may
present matters of defense and the statute then declares that the
court "shall hear and determine the matter in a summary manner".'
It will be recalled that foreclosure proceedings may not
be started until at least three years after delinquency and it may
be five years if it is a county certificate of delinquency, rather than
one held by a private person. In order to prevent a taxpayer from
raising more or less technical defenses so long after the assessment
and levy of the tax, the statute directs the court in the foreclosure
proceedings to disregard or correct a great variety of irregularities
that may have occurred. This part of the statute reads as follows:
O'State ex rel. Chamberlin v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111,, 49 Pac. 243 (1897) ;
cf. State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996
(1926) for the use of the writ of mandamus to compel tax officers to
act T
in a way that imposes added burdens on taxpayers.

" 1Pierce County ex rel. Maloney v. Spike, 19 Wash. 652, 54 Pac. 41

(1898).
O'State ex rel. Lewis v. Hogg, 22 Wash. 646, 62 Pac. 143 (1900), here
the county treasurer was proceeding to correct an assessment roll for a
clerical error certified to him 'by the assessor. The court -pointed out
that the county treasurer was proceeding within the jurisdiction conferred on him by statute. The taxpayer claimed that there was no
statutory appeal from the action of the county treasurer and there was
none. To this the court answered that the writ of review was open to
him and cited Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165 (1898), but this
was In 1900 and it was not until 1913 that the limitations of the writ
of review were first announced, see State ex rel. S. & 1. E. R. R. Co. v.
State Doard of Equalization, 75 Wash. 90, 134 Pac. 695 (1913). Doubtless
the same result would be reached today. The court would simply point
to other available remedies.
210,1R.
REv. STAT. § 11281.
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"... no assessments of property or charge for any of
said taxes shall be considered illegal on account of any
irregularity in the tax lists or assessment rolls or on
account of the assessment rolls or tax lists not having been
made, completed or returned within the time required by
law, or on account of the property having been charged or
listed in the assessment or tax lists without name, or in
any other name than that of the owner, and no error or
informality in the proceedings of any of the officers connected with the assessment, levying or collection of the
taxes, shall vitiate or in any manner affect the tax or the
assessment thereof, and any irregularity or informality in
the assessment rolls or tax lists or in any of the proceedings connected with the assessment or levy of such taxes
or any omission or defective act of any officer or officers
connected with the assessment or levying of such taxes,
may be, in the discretion of the court, corrected, supplied
and made to conform to the law by the court." 110
At an early date the court said rather broadly that a defense
would prevail only when the error complained of "operated to the
injury of the complaining party, and is incurable by any judgment
that can be entered in the foreclosure proceedings.'"' In that
case the county treasurer had divided a lot of land in half and
had issued a certificate of delinquency as to one half and he had
done this without notice to the owners. This, the court said, had
not injured the owners. It did not, of course, affect the amount
of the tax. In another case the taxpayer had attacked the sufficiency of a book of certificates of delinquency issued by the county
treasurer to the county, but the court was satisfied that it could
correct any defect." 2
There are certain defenses, however, that will prevail. Payment,
of course, is a good defense." 3 Also, the taxpayer may assert that
the property is exempt from taxation," 4 that it is sought to be
taxed to meet a municipal obligation incurred before the land was
included within the municipality," 5 that different lots of land were
not separately valued as required by statute' and last, but by no
§ 11281.
"'Smith v. Newell, 32 Wash. 369, 73 Pae. 369 (1903).
"'Jefferson County v. Trumbull, 34 Wash. 276, 75 Pac. 876 (1904).
"'0REm. RyV. STAT.

"'Woodham v. Anderson, 32 Wash. 500, 73 Pac. 536 (1903); Callison

v. Smith, 44 Wash. 202, 87 Pac. 120 (1906); Solberg v. Baldwin, 46 Wash.
196, 89 Pac. 561 (1907).
""Thurston County v. Sisters of Charity, 14 Wash. 264, 44 Pac. 252

(1896).
"'Holcomb v. Johnson's Estate, 43 Wash. 362, 86 Pac. 409 (1906); see
also Swanson v. Hoyle, 32 Wash. 169, 72 Pac. 1011 (1903) in which it
appears that if this defense is not raised In the foreclosure proceedings
it may not be raised by 'way of collateral attack on those proceedings.
"'Lockwood v. Roys, 11 Wash. 697, 40 Pac. 346 (1895) the court said
that this was not a mere irregularity, but rather Involved a substantial
right of the taxpayer.
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means least, that the land has been excessively overvalued to the
point of actual or constructive fraud."1 7 This last defense is no
longer available, and how this came to be will be considered
later.1" 8
The foregoing discussion relates only to defenses that involve
the validity of the tax itself. There are a number of points that
may be raised that go to the regularity of the foreclosure proceedings, but these will not be considered. There are also cases
involving disputes between private parties in which tax proceedings are attacked collaterally but these, too, will not be considered.
The Anti-Injunction Statute of 1931 and Its Effect on Taxpayers'
Remedies
In 1931 the Legislature undertook to require taxpayers who had
grievances that they wished to present before a court to pay first
and argue about it in court later. At that time taxpayers had a
wide choice of remedies that permitted them to withhold payment
of any amount under dispute until after there had been a judicial
determination of the disputed points. The Legislature sought to
abolish these remedies, and in their place it said to taxpayers that
they must first pay under protest the full amount of the tax and
then bring suit to recover back the amount claimed to have been
illegally exacted. In that suit they might present their grievances
to a court. The fiscal advantages of this arrangement are clear
enough. They are particularly striking when applied to large taxpayers.
The statute" 9 first prohibits the issuance of injunctions to restrain "the collection of any tax or any part thereof, or the sale
of any property for non-payment of any tax or part thereof"
except in two cases, first, when the law under which the tax is
imposed is void, and second, when the property upon which the
tax is imposed is exempt. 120 It is next provided that if any taxpayer deems any tax on his property to be "unlawful or excessive", he may pay it under protest and then maintain an action
to recover back the amount so paid.' 2 ' There are various provisions
for the setting up of a fund for the payment of judgments recov,rWhatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 7 Wash. 101, 34 Pac. 563 (1893);
Pacific County v. Ellis, 12 Wash. 108, 40 Pac. 632 (1895); Olympia v.
Stevens, 15 Wash. 601, 47 Pac. 11 (1896); Holcomb v. Johnson's Estate,
43 Wash. 362, 86 Pac. 409 (1906); in these cases if the defense prevails
the court will simply determine the proper assessed value and the tax
may be collected on the corrected assessment.
ulSee Western Machinery Exchange v. Grays Harbor, infra note 156.
W"REm. REv. STAT.
'"REm. R v. STAT.
"'REm. REV. STAT.

§ 11315-1-8.
§ 11315-1.
§ 11315-2.
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ered by taxpayers 2 ' and the statute ends with a sweeping provision
that the remedy provided is exclusive. "Except as permitted by
this act," the statute reads, "no action shall ever be brought attacking the validity of any tax, or any portion of any tax."12
The constitutionality of the statute has been sustained,2 4 but there
are important questions as to its meaning and application and
particularly its effect on the many and diverse remedies that
existed at the time of its passage.
The first question to be considered is this: At what point of time
is an injunction foreclosed? The statute says that injunctions
and restraining orders may not be issued to restrain "the collection" of any tax. The determination of the point of time at which
"collection" begins is important because injunctive relief is not
foreclosed if applied for prior to that time. It would seem clear
that the collection process begins at least when the tax becomes
due and payable and collectible. In the case of both the tax on
real and personal property the process of collection begins on
February 15th of each year for the taxes levied for the preceding
year, though in the rare cases of the removal from the state or
the dissipation of personal property the collection of the personal
1 25
property tax may begin by jeopardy distraint at any time.
They may be paid at any time after that date and become delinquent on May 31st.12' The statute would be emasculated if it
should be said that "the collection" of a tax does not begin until
steps are taken to foreclose the tax lien, either by judicial proceedings in the case of the real property tax, or by distraint in
the case of the personal property tax. Surely collection begins
when the county treasurer sends out notices that certain amounts
are due and payable, and injunctive relief has been barred under
the statute when sought after that date. 2 ' But does collection
begin at any point of time before that, and, if so, at what point of
time? The court has had some trouble with this question.
In Denny v. Wooster, 25 a taxpayer was permitted to secure inREV. STAT. § 11315-3-4.
1'REM. REV. STAT. § 11315-7. There is a proviso to this section that
will be consilered later.
"'Casco v. Thurston County, 163 Wash. 666, 2 P. (2d) 677 (1931); noted
in 7 WAsH. L. REV. 230.
"'See notes 30 and 46 supra: see REm. REV. STAT. § 11250 for the
statute governing jeopardy distraint.
21This date applies only to one-half of the real property tax since it
may be paid in installments. Delinquency as to the second half occurs on
November 30th, see REm. REV. STAT. § 11244, though in the case of the
personal property tax, failure to pay the first installment when due
renders the entire amount delinquent.
'Church v. Benton County, 186 Wash. 59, 56 P. (2d) 1010 (1936).
28175 Wash. 272, 27 P. (2d) 328 (1933).
"'REm.
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junctive relief against an assessor to prevent him from extending
on the tax rolls a levy alleged to be illegal as being in excess of
the applicable millage limit. The amount of the levy must be
certified to the assessor on or before the second Monday in October,
and he must then extend the levy on his tax rolls before the fifteenth day of December and transmit the rolls to the county
auditor. 29 Between those dates, then, the assessor is engaged in
extending the levy against the values of particular pieces of property shown on his assessment roll and until this has been done,
the definite amount payable by any taxpayer is not known. In
this case, the aggrieved taxpayer acted promptly and filed his
complaint a few days after the challenged levies had been certified
to the assessor and before the assessor had extended the levy on
his rolls.180 The court had little difficulty in concluding that injunctive relief was proper, in spite of the 1931 statute.1 8' The
court said that, "It ought not be held that, prior to the right to
pay or collect taxes, a taxpayer should be deprived of the right
to seek redress ..."132 This language is ambiguous. It suggests
that the 1931 statute would not foreclose resort to equity if the
taxpayer acted at any time before February 15th, for not until
then does the right to collect real property taxes exist, 8 3 though
in a few rare cases the personal property tax may be collected
before that date. 4 But what of the reference to the "right to
pay"? The taxpayer coukd pay the tax at any time after the
assessor has extended the levies against the values of the property
shown on his assessment roll and thereby fixed the amount of the
tax. Under this view, injunctive relief would be barred at some
indeterminate time between the second Monday in October and
"REx. REV. STAT. §§ 11239-11240.
"Old., Brief of Appellant, p. 6; Brief of Respondents-Cross Appellants,
p. 2-3.
1
mSee also to the same effect Palmquist v. Taylor, 177 Wash. 306, 31
P. (2d) 894 (1934), and Walker v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 483, 32 P. (2d)
1062 (1934).
1id. at p. 276; note the chronology of this case; the challenged levy
was certified to the assessor on October 5, 1933; on October 10th the complaint was filed; on October 28th the Superior Court entered judgment
and on December 1st the Supreme Court rendered its decision. If we take
the date when the tax ordinarily becomes payable as decisive, that is,
February 15th, it is evident that even at the time of the decision of the
Supreme Court the County Txeasurer could not have demanded payment.
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, noted this and pointed out that the
resort to equity was at a time when it would avoid the results at which
the statute was directed. On the other hand, the taxpayer could have paid
his tax at any time after the assessor had extended the levy on his rolls
for at that time the specific amount payable was determined.
.See Church v. Benton County, 186 Wash. 59, 56 P. (2d) 1010 (1936),

note 127 supra.

"'See note 125 supra.
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the fifteenth day of December, that is, at whatever time the assessor had actually extended the levy against the property of the
taxpayer seeking the injunction. In Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Wooster,13 5 it was not necessary to resolve this issue, for the taxpayer had sought injunctive relief at a point of time even earlier
than in Denny v. Wooster. This taxpayer sought to enjoin the
assessor from extending on the assessment rolls certain increased
values of property ordered by a County Board of Equalization,
contending that the County Board had acted without authority
of law. There was no difficulty in permitting injunctive relief in
this case.
In the construction of a statute of this kind, an important consideration should be that whatever date is fixed after which injunctive relief is foreclosed, that date should at least be definitely
fixed. The later case of Ballard v. Wooster-1 6 has thrown the
whole problem into the realm of speculation. There the taxpayer
filed his complaint on December 13th, which was two days before
the assessor was required to certify his completed assessment rolls
to the county auditor but after the time when he had completed
the extension of the levies on the assessment roll. This point of
time, the court said, was too late, and injunctive relief was foreclosed by the statute. It is possible to reconcile this decision with
that in Denny v. Wooster, for there the injunction was sought and
allowed before the assessor had extended the levy on the assessment
roll, while in Ballard v. Wooster it was sought and denied after
he had completed that step. In one case, then, the definite amount
of the tax payable by the taxpayer had not been calculated and
entered on the rolls, while in the later case it had been. The
muddle grows out of the opinions of the court in these two cases.
In the Ballard case the court said plainly that "After the certification of equalization by the State Board of Equalization to the
county assessor, the final act of fixing the tax levy is completed,
and not until then" 13 and when that point of time has arrived
it is too late, for then the attempt is to "enjoin levies already
made".""' In Denny v. Wooster, however, the injunction was permitted, even though it was sought after the certification of the
equalization by the State Board to the assessor, but Denny v.
Wooster was not overruled. It was distinguished as involving a
challenge of a levy resulting in "a void tax". This suggests that
perhaps the court meant that an injunction was proper in that
"1178 Wash. 180, 34 P. (2d) 451 (1934).
" 182 Wash. 408, 45 P. (2d) 511 (1935).
"'ld. at p. 412.
111Id. at p. 413.
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case because it fell within the exception permitting an injunction
when the claim is that "the law under which the tax is imposed
is void", and yet there was no claim that "the law" was void. The
claim was that the levies made exceeded permissible millage limits.
There was no attack on the validity of any statute. And this view
of Denny v. Wooster necessarily involves a construction of the
exception that brings within it a "void tax", as well as the case
when the claim is that "the law under which the tax is imposed
is void". Nor was there any mention of the exception in the
opinion, and there was a careful discussion of the point of time
at which "the collection" of a tax began, a discussion that would
be quite irrelevant if the case fell within the exception.
Whatever may be the final resolution of the muddle created by
these two opinions, the safest conclusion is that in view of the
Ballard decision a taxpayer should seek his injunction at some
point of time before the State Board of Equalization has completed
its work and certified the equalized values together with the levy
for state purposes to the county assessor. This certifieation must
be made about the end of September." 9 In the Ballard case the
taxpayer was seeking relief from an assessment alleged to be excessive, so perhaps if he challenges the legality of a levy the court
may still follow Denny v. Wooster and permit injunctive relief
if it is sought even after the assessor has started to extend the
amount of the challenged levy on the tax rolls but before the
job has been completed. After all, it is not until then that the
taxpayer has any way of knowing what the levy will be and
whether there is any ground for attacking it. If he seeks relief
from an excessive assessment, on the other hand, he must do so
before the State Board has completed its work, but in all these
cases the taxpayer is really attacking values fixed by the assessor
as equalized by the County Board of Equalization. We have already noted that the State Board does not change any locally
fixed ssessed values but confines itself to an equalization of county
totals for the purpose of the state levy only.140 The taxpayer may,
then, attack these locally assessed values at any time prior to the
'The State Board of Equalization meets on the first Tuesday in Sep-

tember, and may sit -for not to exceed twenty days; within three days

after completion of its work it must certify the results to the state auditor
and he, in turn, must certify the record to each County Assessor within
three days after that. Query whether injunctive proceedings must be
commenced before the results of the Board's work are certified to the
State Auditor or would there still be time to act before the State Auditor
certified them to the County Assessor? Surely -the safest procedure would
be to act before the record has left the -hands-of the Board and that means
taking action before the Board has adjourned.
"'See note 27 supra.
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adjournment of the State Board in September. It may seem
strange to derive this result from a statute prohibiting injunctions
against the collection of a tax, but at least it is understandable,
definite and workable. The foregoing description of the assessment
process does not, of course, apply to the assessment of the intercounty properties of public utilities by the Tax Commission. In
such cases the State Board may change particular values fixed
by the Tax Commission so if the taxpayer is required to act before
the State Board has completed its work, he is being compelled to
act before the assessed value of his property has been finally determined.
If the taxpayer is challenging the authority of the assessing
body to assess his property, then there is no difficulty if he seeks
his injunction to restrain the body from taking any steps,' 4' but if
he waits too long before asserting that ground for attacking the
validity of the proceedings, he will be in the midst of the muddle
created by the cases just discussed.
We have noted that the prohibition against injunctions does
not apply when the claim is that "the law under which the tax
is imposed is void", or that the property is exempt. 1 42 Were it not
for the language employed in Denny v. Wooster, already adverted
to, it would seem clear enough that the first exception relates to
cases where the contention is that the taxing statute is unconstitutional and it has been given this application in a decision of the
Federal District Court.143 But the opinion in Denny v. Wooster
suggests, as we have seen, that perhaps the court feels that a tax
that is void is the same thing as a law that is void. It is evident
that any such construction of the statute would raise more questions than it would settle. The exception as to exempt property
should cause little difficulty. In the past the court has often
issued injunctions to restrain taxes when this claim has been4
raised, 4 and in one recent case the practice has been continued.' 1
The magic words "paid under protest" that sufficed before this
statute are no longer sufficient. The protest must accompany the
payment, it must be in writing and must set forth "all the grounds
upon which such tax is claimed to be unlawful or excessive."'l
"'Northwestern Imp. Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P. (2d) 1083
(1935) and Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 46, 53 P.
(2d) 308 (1936) are cases of this kind.
1'REm. REV. STAT. § 11315-1.
"'1Bank of California N. A. v. King County, 16 F. Supp. 976 (1936).

U"'See Phillips v. Thurston County, 35 Wash. 187, 76 Pac. 993 (1904);
Seattle & P. S.Packing Co. v. Seattle, 51 Wash. 49, 97 Pac. 1093 (1908).
'Wresley Foundation v. King County, 185 Wash. 12, 52 P. (2d) 1247
(1935).
"'REir. REV. STAT. § 11315-2; in State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co.
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The statute shortens the statute of limitations that had theretofore
been applied to suits to recover taxes paid under protest.147 The
suit must be brought not later than the 30th day of January next
48
succeeding the date when the tax was payable.
The statute also contains the important provision that "Except
as permitted by this act, no action shalfever be brought attacking
the validity of any tax, or any portion of any tax."'' 49 This language is all inclusive and is quite broad enough to cover the
injunction which is dealt with specifically in the first section of
the statute. Were it not for the two exceptions to the prohibitions
of the first section, there is no reason why the purpose of the
statute might not have been fully accomplished without the specific
treatment of injunctions in the first section. The injunction, then,
is specifically prohibited in the first section, and it is the only
remedy that is prohibited by that section. The fate of the other
remedies would seem to depend upon the extent to which the
court gives effect to the section making payment under protest
the exclusive remedy. There is little to be gained by attempting
to stretch the words "injunctions and restraining orders" of the
first section to include other forms of action. We have noted already that bills to quiet title and actions to reduce the assessed
value of property have been said to be of equitable cognizance,
and a plausible argument may be worked out to the effect that
these forms of action are included in the words of the first section,
but there is little to be gained by this. Other forms of action should
meet the same fate under the language of the section making payment under protest the exclusive remedy. The action to reduce
the assessed value of property has already met this fate. 5 There
is no reason to suppose that the bill to remove a cloud on title will
have any other fate.
v. Yakima County, 92 Wash. Dec. 167, 73 P. (2d) 759 (1937), the formal
words "Paid Under Protest" were held to 'be insufficient under the
statute; in C. I. T. Corporation v. Spokane County, 186 Wash. 165, 57
P. (2d) 322 (1936) it was pointed out that a written claim for refund
is something else again and a self-serving statement in the claim that
the tax had been paid under protest is not enough in the absence of
some showing that the protest was made at the time of payment or at
some other time and that it was in writing. Query as to whether a
written protest before payment would suffice or must the protest accompany payment? Without doubt a protest after payment would not suffice,
no matter how soon after.
"'See Pacific Coal & Lumber Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 278, 233
Pac. 953 (1925), In which it was held that the three-year statute of
limitations applied to actions to recover taxes paid under protest.
.'REM. REV. STAT. §
'"REm. REV. STAT. §

11315-6.

11315-7.
"'Church v. Benton County, 186 Wash. 59, 56 P. (2d) 1010 (1936),
though the court did not discuss this point, It is none the less implicit
in the decision; perhaps the court felt that it was too obvious to require
discussion.
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As to the writ of certiorari or review, it has already been noted
that it was of little importance at the time of the passage of the
1931 statute. If the exclusive remedy section is given full effect,
it would seem that even the limited use to which the writ may be
put in tax cases 51 will meet the same fate. That is, it was used to
review the power of a Board of Equalization to take certain action,
and it may still be used for this purpose, but if it is not applied
for in time, the prohibitions of the 1931 statute may compel a
taxpayer to pay under protest if he wishes to present his argument to a court.' 52
The assumption of this statement is that the court will declare
that until the point of time has been reached at which injunctions
are barred under the first section, other forms of action, as well as
injunctions, may be used, but once the point has been reached when
injunctions are barred, then other forms of action are barred as
well under the exclusive remedy section. This construction, at
least, would give a consistent application to the different sections
of the statute and this, too, without taking undue liberties with
the words used.'
The writ of mandamus or mandate and its counterpart, the
writ of prohibition, are not likely to be affected very much by the
1931 statute. This is evident from a review of the cases involving
the use of these writs. In those cases in which constitutional issues
have been raised, there is no reason why these writs may not still
be used, for such issues are expressly excepted from the prohibitions of the 1931 statute. With all these extraordinary writs there
is the requirement that other available remedies at law are inadequate, and it is not unlikely that the court may revive this here"'See State ex rel. Thompson v. Nichols, supra note 922 and discussion.
..'Cf . Northwestern Imp. Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P. (2d)
1083 (1935); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 46, 53
P. (2d) 308 (1936).
"' 3It may be suggested that the language of the exclusive remedy section prohibits any action "attacking the validity of any tax" while the
first section prohibits injunctions against "the collection of any tax"
and the differences in wording may suggest differences in application.
Under the first section it is necessary to determine at what point of
time "the collection of any tax" begins, while under the exclusive remedy
section it is necessary to determine at what point of time there is "a
tax" to be attacked and it might be decided that there are different
points of time under the two sections. Little is gained by all this. If
the point of time under the first section should be later than that under
the exclusive remedy section, the taxpayer would simply use the injunction for the period not covered by both sections, for it would not be
barred until the later point of time is reached. If the point of time is
the same under -both sections, then the taxpayer would simply have a
greater choice of forms of action that he might use until the time is
reached when any remedy other than payment under protest is too late.
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tofore moribund point. Payment under protest has always been
available, but at least the 1931 statute puts it in the foreground
and makes provision whereby the remedy is made more effective
by setting up a fund for payment of judgments that may be
recovered.
The exclusive remedy section contains a proviso that reads as
follows: "That this section shall not be construed as depriving
the defendants in any tax foreclosure proceeding of any valid
defense allowed by law to the tax sought to be foreclosed therein."1" The legislature wrote this proviso without expressing any
limitation as to particular defenses available to taxpayers in foreclosure proceedings. The legislature simply said "any valid defense". The court, however, has been quick to rewrite the proviso. We have already noted that from 1893 down to the present
time, taxpayers have always been able to resist foreclosure by
asserting the defense that the property has been excessively overvalued to the point of actual or constructive fraud.' 55 In a recent
decision, however, the court has said that "any valid defense"
does not mean "any valid defense", but rather means any defense
other than excessive overvaluation. 5 6 How this came to be is a
little difficult to explain. In 1933 the court approached this statute
with the idea that under "the great weight of authority" its provisions must not be extended beyond "the clear import of the
language used",'5 but apparently this was forgotten in 1937, for
in the opinion in this recent ease the court speaks broadly of the
general purposes of the statute "to facilitate and expedite the
raising of public revenue"' 5 and undertakes to construe the proviso, as if there was anything to construe, in such a way as to
promote this general purpose. The power of a taxpayer to interpose this defense in a foreclosure proceeding, the court said, would
largely defeat the proper purpose of the statute. The trouble with
all this is that there is nothing to construe. The proviso is simple
in its statement. There has been no question since 1893 that this
defense was a proper one in a tax foreclosure proceeding. There
is no reason to suppose that the legislature was unaware of this.
1REm. REv. STAT. § 11315-7.
1''See cases cited note 117 supra.
'15Western Machinery Exchange v. Grays Harbor, 190 Wash. 447, 68 P.
(2d) 613 (1937); in the case of Island County v. Calvin Philips & Co.,
No. 26951 in the Supreme Court, the authority of the Western Machinery
Exchange case has been challenged in a case involving the assertion of
the defense of excessive overvaluation in proceedings to foreclose a real
property tax lien; as this issue of the LAW REVmw goes to press there
has been a reargument en bane but the decision of the court has not
been handed down.
"'Denny v. Wooster, 175 Wash. 272, 275-276, 27 P. (2d) 328 (1933).
'"Western Machinery Exchange v. Grays Harbor, supra at p. 454.
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Is any defense left after this decision, that is, any defense that
goes to the validity of the tax itself ? The court gives small com159
fort in suggesting that a plea of payment will still prevail.
Doubtless the plea that the property is exempt will still be heard
for that is a matter excepted from the operation of the 1931 statute. But what of the other defenses that have been raised in these
proceedings ?16 In the face of this decision there is no telling what
may happen. It is possible that the court may distinguish this case
for it was a personal property tax case and we have seen that that
tax is collected by distraint rather than by foreclosure of the tax
lien in judicial proceedings. The language of the proviso permits
the assertion of defenses only in proceedings to foreclose the tax
lien and that would seem to limit its application to the real property tax. The court held, however, that a taxpayer who was seeking to enjoin the sale of personal property after distraint would
be treated as though he were a defendant in a foreclosure proceeding, at least for the purposes of the proviso. Unless the court
had done this the proviso would have been inapplicable in personal
property tax cases and the taxpayer would have been left without
any means of asserting any defense for the statute of limitations
had long since run against payment under protest. If this case is
adhered to in a real property tax foreclosure case, the taxpayer
whose grievance goes to the matter of excessive overvaluation of
his property must, then, start his proceedings before payment, at
a time when it is not too late under the statute, or pay under
protest before the new and shortened statute of limitations has
run against him, or be forever barred from raising that issue in
a court. This forces the taxpayer "to move expeditiously", as the
court put it.16 It is apparently the judgment of the court that
unless this view is taken taxpayers will be tempted to sit back
and do nothing until the time for foreclosure of the tax lien has
arrived, and then assert their defense of excessive overvaluation.
May a taxpayer avoid the troubles under the state statute by
resort to the federal courts? It is obvious that the state statute
cannot operate to deprive a federal court of its equity jurisdiction
but one old and one recent federal statute have, taken together,
gone a long way to close the doors of the federal courts to cases
involving state taxes. The old statute provides that suits in equity
shall not lie in federal courts "in any case where plain, adequate
and complete remedy may be had at law". 2 The remedy at law
'1I.

at p. 453.

' See the cases referred to supra, particularly notes 115 and 116.
16'1d. at p. 454.
REV. STAT. § 723; U. S. C. TITLE 28, § 384; JUDICIAL CODE,

§

267.
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that is there referred to must be one that is available to the taxpayer either in the state court or in the federal court if the essential
elements of federal jurisdiction are present. 68 This statutory command has been said to have "peculiar force in cases where the suit
... is brought to enjoin the collection of a state tax in courts of a
different, though paramount sovereignty".114 If this is not enough
to bar actions in the federal courts the Congress has recently deprived them of jurisdiction of any suits to enjoin the "assessment,
levy, or collection" of any state tax "where a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the courts of
such state".J I In so far as this refers to an adequate remedy at
law in the state courts, it remains to be seen whether it has added
anything to what had already been derived from the older statute.
But the reference to an adequate remedy in equity in the state
courts will doubtless have some bearing in tax cases, for the 1931
statute permits relief in equity in the state courts in cases covered
by the two exceptions and also, as we have seen, if it is sought soon
enough. The availability of this remedy may bar a like remedy
in the federal courts under the new statute. The 1931 statute will
be important in the federal courts in its bearing on the adequacy
of the remedy at law under both federal statutes. By recent
amendment to the state statute it has been specifically provided
that suits to recover taxes paid under protest may be maintained
"in any federal court of competent jurisdiction" as well as in a
superior court of the state.1 66 The taxpayer must then be prepared
to show that for some reason this remedy at law is of no avail. The
federal courts have indicated that "special circumstances" will
relax the rule against injunctions and it was relaxed in the case
of a large taxpayer with property located in some twenty-three
113Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); The Henrietta Mills v.
Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121 (1930); see also City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24 (1934).
"'Matthews v. Rodgers, supra at p. 525 (1932). Mr. Justice Stone added
that "The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a
proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations,
require that such relief be denied in every case where the assorted federal
right may be preserved without it", at page 525.
IOAct of Aug. 21, 1937 amending 26 U. S. C. A. § 41-1; see U. S. C. A.
CURRENT SERVICE, 1937, p. 701; 1937 Supplement, p. 15.
''RE.
REv. STAT. § 11315-2; as amended by Laws of 1937, ch. 11,
§ 1; cf. Henneford v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 58 Sup. Ct. 415, decided Jan. 31, 1938, in which an injunction was sought in the United

States District Court against enforcement of the Washington "compensating tax"; it appeared that there was no available remedy at law in
the federal court because the taxing statute set up a special procedure
that must be followed, see Laws of 1935, ch. 180, § 199, and this required
that suit be brought only in the Superior Court of Thurston County.
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counties of the state." 7 The court pointed to the multiplicity of
suits at law that would be required, but stressed particularly the
fact that the assessment had been by the State Tax Commission,
and there would be insuperable difficulty in reaching a proper
assessment value against the total amount of property and securing a proper apportionment of that value among the twenty-three
counties if those matters had to be determined in twenty-three
suits at law in as many counties.' 68 If this same type of case
should come up after the recent federal statute, the jurisdiction
of the federal court would not be barred unless the state courts
should permit a suit in equity under like circumstances. If they
did, then there would be an adequate remedy in equity in the state
courts. Before the federal court is deprived of equity jurisdiction
it must decide first, whether there is an adequate remedy at law
in either the federal or state courts, and second, if it concludes
that under the circumstances of the case there is not, then it must
decide whether there is an adequate remedy in equity in the state
courts. It is difficult to determine just what kind of a showing will
move a federal court to act. 61
A Word as to Administrative Finality and the Scope of
Judicial Review
The 1931 statute does not attempt to define in any way the scope
of judicial review when tax matters come before a court, so
presumably the judges will continue to deal with tax questions in
the same manner as they have in the past. It matters not whether
the taxpayer has come into court after payment under protest or by
bill in equity to enjoin collection of a tax, or by any other procedural device, 170 the scope of judicial review is bounded by the
' Skagit County v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 61 F. (2d) 638, C. C. A.
9th, 1932.
'1With this decision, ci. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932),
in which a multiplicity of suits would have been avoided by resort to
equity, but each suit raised some special issues of fact and of law, and
the court was satisfied to let the complaining taxpayers present those
issues in separate suits at law.
'The history of the federal statute prohibiting federal courts from
issuing injunctions to restrain "the assessment or collection of any tax"
indicates that this legislative command has been circumscribed by judicial
exceptions. This statute applies only to federal taxes and it may be
that in view of the recent words of the Supreme Court, Matthews v.
Rodgers, supra note 162, federal courts will not display the same freedom
of action when it comes to injunctions directed against state taxes. For
accounts of the history of the federal statute, see Miller, "Restraining
the Collection of Federal Taxes and Penalties," 71 U. or P. LAw REv.
318 (1923); Lewinson, "Restraining the Assessment or Collection of a
Federal Tax," 14 CAL. L. REV. 461 (1926); Note, 49 HARv. L. REv. 109
(1936).
"'Some payment under protest cases are: Carlisle v. Chehalis County,
32 Wash. 284, 73 Pac. 349 (1903); Tacoma Mill Co. v. Pierce County, 130
Wash. 358, 227 Pac. 500 (1924); Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
Yakima County, 149 Wash. 552, 271 Pac. 820 (1928); Northwestern Bank
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same formula of words. There may be variations in the statement
of the formula, but they resolve themselves into the question as
to whether the conduct of the taxing officers has resulted in such
a "grossly inequitable and palpably excessive over-valuation of
real property" as will amount to actual or constructive fraud on
the taxpayer, and this even though it appear that the assessing
officers have acted in entire good faith and honesty.' 1 It goes
without saying that this form of words does little more than express a judicial attitude of mind towards the acts of taxing officers.
The typical grievance of a taxpayer relates to a question of the
valuation of his property. Valuation is not a matter of an exact
formula applied to simple fact situations. It is very much in the
realm of judgment and opinion, and judgments and opinions do
have a way of differing end sometimes differing in striking fashion.
The formula that the judges have worked out permits them to
say in concrete cases whether the valuations fixed by tax officers
differ too much from values that may be more acceptable to the
judges. If the figures differ too much the acts of the taxing officers
are tagged as "constructively fraudulent", and the court will
proceed to assess the property itself. The cases in which this formula and some subsidiary formulas and presumptions that go with
it have been applied have been reviewed recently. 7 2 It is enough
to note here that when the court does grant relief to a taxpayer,
it goes all the way and the final order of the court involves what
is in effect a judicial reassessment of the property. In this way
the judges have become a part of the tax machinery of the state.
This raises an important question as to the propriety of the
courts occupying this position. The state has created an hierarchy
of administrative machinery for the assessment of property, the
levy of a tax and its collection. We have reviewed the position
of the taxpayer when this machinery is in operation and the various
stages in the process at which he may present his grievances and be
heard. It might be expected that in an orderly system of taxation
the taxpayer would be required to exhaust his available administrative remedies before coming into court with his troubles. 7 8
In this way the taxing machinery would be able to operate in the
v. Adams County, 174 Wash. 447, 24 P. (2d) 1086 (1933).

For cases in-

volving other procedural devices, see the cases cited In connection with
the discussion of available remedies prior to the 1931 statute.

"'See First Thought Gold Mines, Ltd., v. Stevens County, 91 Wash.
437, 157 Pac. 1080 (1916).
"'See the excellent comment by John N. Rupp, "The Doctrine of Constructive Fraud in the Washington Law of Taxation," 12 WAsH. L. REv.
205 (1937).
raThe question that is raised here is discussed in Stason, "Judicial
Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure to Resort to Administrative
Remedies," 28 MIcH. L. REv. 637 (1930).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
way it was designed to operate and the taxpayer might still come
into court with his grievances but not until the taxing machinery
had had an opportunity to correct the error that is the subject of
complaint.
In all of this the primary concern of the state is in the integrity
of the process of collecting revenue and if this is to operate with
a minimum of friction all around, it is important to consider the
proper functions of administrative officers and judges. For example, if a taxpayer claims that a statute under which he is sought
to be taxed is unconstitutional, there is no reason why he should
not be heard in court at any stage of the taxing process. The
answer to this question must come from the judges. It is beyond
the province of tax officers to give this answer. If the taxpayer
complains that the taxing officers have misconstrued a statute or
have not obeyed its command as to procedure, notice and hearing
and the like then, too, there is little reason to require a taxpayer
to pursue his way through the administrative machinery. Judicial
review is a means of compelling tax officers to obey the commands
of the statutes under which they must act and the judges may
act as well before as after the taxing process has been completed.
If we turn to cases where the complaint involves some minor irregularity in the taxing process, such as some irregularity in the
tax roll-a lack of signature or verification, an assessment in gross
or in the wrong county or to the wrong person or on the wrong
tax roll-then the administrative machinery has full authority to
remedy the wrong, and there is no reason why a taxpayer should
he
be free to run to court with such troubles, at least, not until
74
has sought relief from the taxing machinery without avail.1
The trouble comes with cases that fall somewhere between the
types of cases already mentioned. In this category comes the multitude of cases involving some question of valuation. In these cases
it has long been the position of the court that judicial relief under
the guise of the verbal formula already mentioned will not be
denied because the taxpayer has not pursued the remedies that the
state has provided in the administrative hierarchy." 5 The taxpayer who sits by while the taxing machinery of the state is in
17'In Coolidge v. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 95, 68 Pac. 391 (1902), the
taxpayer brought a bill, in equity, to enjoin collection of a tax, and,
among other matters, complained of certain irregularities in the tax rolls,
but the court undertook to correct them and found support in REM. REV.
STAT. § 11281, which is the section that empowers the superior court in
which foreclosure of the tax lien is sought to correct certain irregularities; the court said that this section was ample "to invalidate all irregularities not affecting the substantial justice of the tax"-at p. 100.
"'Whatcom County v. Fairhaven Land Co., 7 Wash. 101, 34 Pac. 563
(1893), where a taxpayer was permitted to raise the defense of excessive
overvaluation In foreclosure proceedings to collect the tax, though he
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operation secures the same consideration before the court as if he
had been diligent in seeking to have his grievances corrected in
the administrative machinery. In taking this position the court is
making the assumption that those higher up in the administrative
hierarchy will be quite as "constructively fraudulent" as those
whose acts form the basis for allegation of fraud, that is, that it is
idle to require a taxpayer to seek relief from a body that probably
or perhaps even certainly will not give it. If we take this expression literally, it is not exactly complimentary but perhaps it should
be put down as one of those forms of words by which something
that is not so is treated as being so for reasons discoverable only
by those versed in the use of such words of art. A new form of
words would serve the same purpose without carrying with it any
suggestion that the judiciary is moved to act only when it entertains an unfavorable judgment as to the integrity of the taxing
machinery of the state. Differences of honest and fair minded
opinion as to value do, after all, typify ad valorem taxation.
Little is gained by attempting to draw verbal distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact. It is all too easy
for a court to treat a given disparity between an assessed value
and the claimed true value as amounting to "constructive fraud"
and so treat it -as a question of law and remove it from the administrative machinery into the court room where questions of law
are supposed to find a more congenial atmosphere. 70 After all,
it is a problem of valuation no matter where it is found. It would
seem to be more pertinent to ask, who is best equipped to solve the
problem, the tax officers of the state or the judges of the state?
When judgment has been exercised in answering this question it
will be time enough to couch the answer in words that will mark
out the position of the courts in the taxing processes of the state.
In formulating this position it must not be overlooked that while
there may be tyranny, both petty and gross, dishonesty, bad faith
and actual fraud on the part of taxing officers, taxpayers, too,
had not raised this grievance before the Board of Equalization; Templeton v. Pierce County, 25 Wash. 377, 65 Pac. 553 (1901), where the taxpayer sought judicial relief from a value fixed by the assessor without
having appeared before the Board of Equalization; Miller v. Pierce
County, 28 Wash. 110, 68 Pac. 358 (1902), to the same effect; Yakima
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Yakima County, 149 Wash. 552, 271 Pao. 820
(1928), a personal property tax case in which the taxpayer went directly
into court after payment under protest without resort to either the
County or State Boards of Equalization; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Wooster, 178 Wash. 180, 34 P. (2d) 451 (1934), accord; the 1931 statute
will have no effect on the position taken In these cases; the last two
cases both involved payment under protest, and in the Yakima Bank
case, the court reviewed the whole matter and adhered to the position
taken in the Whatcom County case in 1893.
"'See, for example, Bellingham Development Co. v. Whatcom County,
187 Wash. 15, 59 P. (2d) 920 (1936).
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manifest these same and other human qualities. Should the courts
confine themselves to the function of punishing the taxpayer for
his tax waywardness and of protecting the revenue collecting processes of the state from the dishonesties of its tax officers? Should
it go beyond that and take some part in the process of valuation
of property for tax purposes when honest minds have differed?
At the present time the court is committed to an affirmative answer
to this last question.

